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Abstract
Theories in physics usually do not address “the present” or “the now”. How-
ever, they usually have a precise notion of an “instant” (or state). I review
how this notion appears in relational point mechanics and how it suffices to
determine durations - a fact that is often ignored in modern presentations
of analytical dynamics. An analogous discussion is attempted for General
Relativity. Finally we critically remark on the difference between relation-
alism in point mechanics and field theory and the problematic foundational
dependencies between fields and spacetime.
This contribution is based on a talk delivered at the workshop The For-
gotten Present. A Quest for a Richer Concept of Time, held at the Parmenides
Foundation at Munich-Pullach from April 29th - May 2nd 2010. This written
up version will be published in the Volume The Forgotten Present, edited by
Thomas Filk and Albrecht von Mu¨ller, to be published by Springer Verlag
2013.
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1 Introduction
All known fundamental physical laws are of dynamical type. Without exception,
they are all required to provide answers for initial-value problems. This means the
following: If we specify the state of a physical system the laws allow us to deduce
further states that are usually interpreted as lying to the future, or past, or both, of
the initially given one. Except for General Relativity, this is formally achieved by
labelling the states by an external parameter t that - without further justification - is
interpreted as “time” (whatever this means). In this contribution I wish to point out
that this parameter may be eliminated and that measures of duration can be read
off the sequence of states obtained from the dynamical laws.
In the traditional formulation, an initial-value problem is said to be well posed
if and only if the determination of the future (and possibly past) states is unique,
and continuously dependent on the initial state. The last condition means that if
we sufficiently restrict the variation of the initial state we can let the evolution vary
less than any given bound. These conditions are not only satisfied in Newtonian
mechanics, which serves as a paradigmatic example in this respect, but also in the
mathematically and conceptually and most complicated theories, like Einstein’s
theory of General Relativity. Albert Einstein, as well as David Hilbert, wrote down
the field equation of General Relativity in November 1915. But only in the late
1950s did mathematicians succeed to prove that it indeed allowed for well posed
initial-value problems. Had this turned out to be false this would have possibly
led physicists to abandon General Relativity, despite all its other convincing fea-
tures. To allow for a well posed initial-value problem is presumably the single most
important sanity check for any candidate fundamental dynamical law in physics.
This is not restricted to classical laws and classical determinism. The funda-
mental dynamical law in Quantum Mechanics, Schro¨dinger’s equation, also allows
for well posed initial-value problems. The quantum-mechanical state evolves ac-
cording to this equation just as deterministically and continuously as the state in
Newtonian mechanics does according to Newton’s or Hamilton’s equations. The
typical quantum-mechanical indeterminacy, that distinguishes it so drastically from
classical mechanics does not concern the evolution of states, it concerns the rela-
tion of states to observable features of the system under consideration. But this
shall not be the issue we address here. Therefore we will restrict attention to clas-
sical (i.e. non quantum) laws. Our concern is the problem of how to characterise,
in a physically meaningful way, data that suffice to determine the evolution and
how to find a measure of duration merely from that data.
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2 Newtonian Mechanics
Newton’s famous third law is written in standard modern text-book language as
m~¨x = ~F
(
t, ~x(t), ~˙x(t)
)
. (1)
In this form it is meant to apply to an idealised object called mass point. This may
the thought of as extensionless object (“point”) of position ~x and mass value m. A
single overdot denotes the derivative with respect to the parameter (“time”) t (i.e.
the rate of change of the dotted quantity) and a double overdot the second “time”
derivative. Finally, the right-hand side denotes the force, ~F , which in the case of
just one particle is supposed to be externally specified and possibly dependent on t,
the instantaneous position ~x(t) of the particle and its instantaneous velocity ~˙x(t).
Given the function ~F , Newton’s equation has a unique solution once the initial
position and initial velocity of the particle is specified. The solution is the function
t → ~x(t) that assigns a unique position ~x in space to each value t. That is the
standard text-book presentation, except that t is from the start always referred to as
time (Newtonian time).
Equation (1) tells us that an initial datum that suffices to predict the future is
the position and velocity at the initial reading of time. The initial reading of time
is a particular value of the parameter t that represents time, namely that value that
represents the initial moment. This is achieved via a clock. A clock is a another
physical systems that also obeys an equation of the form (1) for the pointer variable
p as function of parameter t. Whereas t is not directly observable, p is. Given
p(t) we may invert this relation and express t as function of p. This is possible
if p is strictly monotonous in t. Systems for which this is not the case would not
count as clocks. We then eliminate t in ~x(t) in favour of p and obtain a function
~x(p). This function expresses a relation between the clock’s pointer position p
and the particle’s position ~x. That relation is observable because p as well as ~x
are observable. This is in contrast to ~x(t) where t is not observable. The elusive
“initial time” is then that reading of p at which we release the particle. This, in
essence, is the idea of ephemeris time [7].
But what happens if there is no obvious way to single out a system as “clock”.
For example, imagine we are given n + 1 (we say n + 1 rather than n for later
notational convenience) mass points moving about under the action of their own
pairwise gravitational attraction. No “clocks” or background reference systems
against which the motions of the particles could be measured are given to us. The
only thing we can measure are the 12n(n + 1) instantaneous relative distances be-
tween pairs of points. Could we still ascertain the validity of Newton’s laws of
mechanics? This is a relevant question since the situation depicted is basically just
that astronomers have to face. And yet it took almost 200 years from the writing of
Newton’s Principia until physicists and mathematicians first answered this question
(of which Newton was fully aware) with sufficient clarity.
The basic question that needs to be answered is how we can construct Newton’s
absolute space and time from observations of relational quantities alone, for it is
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only with respect to special spatial reference frames and special measures of time
that Newton’s equations are valid. Following Ludwig Lange (1863-1936) [10],
these spatial reference frames are called inertial systems and the special measures
of time inertial timescales. In this work Lange showed how to characterise the
inertial system and timescale by means of continuous monitoring the motion of
three force-free particles. We shall not discuss Lange’s argument here, which has
been reviewed elsewhere [8]. Rather, we focus on an alternative approach initi-
ated a year earlier by James Thomson (1822-1892), the elder brother of William
Thomson (1824-1907) [better known as Lord Kelvin], who in 1884 wrote the fol-
lowing [20]:
“The point of space that was occupied by the centre of the ball at any
specified past moment is utterly lost to us as soon as that moment is
past, or as soon as the centre has moved out of that point, having left
no trace recognisable by us of its past place in the universe of space.
There is then an essential difficulty as to our forming a distinct con-
ception either of rest or of rectilinear motion through unmarked space.
[...] We have besides no preliminary knowledge of any principle of
chronometry, and for this additional reason we are under an essential
preliminary difficulty as to attaching any clear meaning to the words
uniform rectilinear motion as commonly employed, the uniformity be-
ing that of equality of spaces passed over in equal times.”
This was immediately rephrased into a mathematical problem by Peter Guthrie Tait
(1831-1901) [19]:
“A set of points move, Galilei wise, with reference to a system of co-
ordinate axes; which may, itself, have any motion whatever. From
observation of the relative positions of the points, merely, to find such
co-ordinate axes.”
This is precisely the problem we set above in the simpler case of free point particles.
So suppose we are given some number of point particles that move about freely,
i.e. there is no mutual attraction or repulsion due to any force, and suppose this
motion does obey Newtons law with reference to some unknown inertial reference
system and inertial timescale. How can we reconstruct these by merely observing
the relative distances of the points? How many points and how many snapshots do
we need to accomplish that?
Reconstructing Absolute Space and Time
Tait’s answer to the above question, given in the same paper [19], is as follows:
We wish to reconstruct the inertial system and timescale from an unordered finite
number of snapshots (“instances”) of instantaneous relative spatial configurations.
For this we consider n + 1 mass-points Pi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) moving inertially, i.e.
without internal and external forces, in flat space. Their trajectories are represented
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by n+1 functions t 7→ ~xi(t) with respect to some, yet unspecified, spatial reference
frame and timescale. The only directly measurable quantities at this point are the
n(n + 1)/2 instantaneous mutual separations of the particles. We now proceed in
the following nine elementary steps:
1. The instantaneous mutual separations are given by n(n+ 1)/2 positive real
numbers per label t. This is equivalent to giving their squares:
Rij := ‖~xi − ~xj‖2 for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n . (2)
2. The knowledge of the n(n+ 1)/2 squared distances, Rij , is, in turn, equiv-
alent to the n(n+ 1)/2 inner products
Qij := (~xi − ~x0) · (~xj − ~x0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n , (3)
as one sees by expressing one set in terms of the other by the simple linear
relations (no summation over repeated indices here):
Rij = Qii +Qjj − 2Qij for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n , (4a)
Ri0 = Qii for 1 ≤ i ≤ n , (4b)
Qij =
1
2
(
Ri0 +Rj0 −Rij
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n . (4c)
3. We now seek an inertial system and an inertial timescale, with respect to
which all particles move uniformly on straight lines. Correspondingly, we
assume
~xi(t) = ~ai + ~vit for 0 ≤ i ≤ n (5)
hold for some time-independent vectors ~ai and ~vi.
4. The 11-parameter redundancy by which such inertial systems and timescales
are defined is given by
a) spatial translations: ~x 7→ ~x+ ~a, ~a ∈ R3, accounting for three parame-
ters,
b) spatial boosts: ~x 7→ ~x+ ~vt, ~v ∈ R3, accounting for three parameters,
c) spatial rotations: ~x 7→ R · ~x, R ∈ O(3) (group of spatial rotations,
including reflections), accounting for three parameters,
d) time translations: t 7→ t+ b, b ∈ R, accounting for one parameter, and
e) time dilations: t 7→ at, a ∈ R− {0}, accounting for one parameter.
The redundancies a) and b) are now eliminated by assuming P0 to rest at the
origin of our spatial reference frame. We then have, assuming (5),
Qij(t) = ~xi(t) · ~xj(t) = ~ai · ~aj + t (~ai · ~vj + ~aj · ~vi) + t2 ~vi · ~vj . (6)
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5. Measuring the mutual distances, i.e. the Qij , at k different values ta (1 ≤
a ≤ k) of t we obtain the kn(n + 1)/2 numbers Qij(tq). From these we
wish to determine the following unknowns, which we order in four groups:
1) the k times ta,
2) the n(n+ 1)/2 products ~ai · ~aj ,
3) the n(n+ 1)/2 products ~vi · ~vj , and
4) the n(n+ 1)/2 symmetric products ~ai · ~vj + ~aj · ~vi.
6. The arbitrariness in choosing the origin and scale of the time parameter t,
which correspond to the points d) and e) above, can, e.g., be eliminated by
choosing t1 = 0 and t2 = 1. Hence the first group has left the k − 2
unknowns t3, . . . , tk. The last remaining redundancy, corresponding to the
spatial rotations in point c), is almost eliminated by choosing P1 on the z axis
and P2 in the xz plane. This suffices as long as P0, P1, P2 are not collinear.
Otherwise we choose three other mass points for which this is true. Here
we exclude the exceptional case where all mass points are co-linear. We
said that this ‘almost’ eliminates the remaining redundancy, since a spatial
reflection at the origin is still possible.
7. Tait’s strategy is now as follows: for each instant in time ta consider the
n(n + 1)/2 equations (6). There are k − 2 unknowns from the first and
n(n+ 1)/2 unknowns each from groups 2), 3), and 4). This gives a total of
kn(n+ 1)/2 equations for the k− 2 + 3n(n+ 1)/2 unknowns. The number
of equations minus the number of unknowns is
(k − 3)n(n+ 1) + 2− k . (7)
This is positive if and only if n ≥ 2 and k ≥ 4. Hence the minimal procedure
is to take four snapshots (k = 4) of three particles (n = 2), which results in
12 equations for 11 unknowns.
8. Recall that we assumed the validity of Newtonian dynamics and that the
given trajectories correspond to force-free particles. This implies the ex-
istence of inertial systems and hence also the existence of solutions to the
equations above. For positive (7) the equations determine the 3n(n + 1)/2
unknowns in groups 2) - 4) which, in turn, determine the 6n − 3 free com-
ponents of ~ai and ~vi up to an overall sign, since 3n(n + 1)/2 ≥ 6n − 3 if
and only if n ≥ 2. Note that we have 6n− 3 rather than 6n free components
for ~ai and ~vi, since we already agreed to put P1 on the z axis, which fixes
two components of ~a1 and ~v1 each, and P2 in the xz plane, which fixes one
component of ~a2 and ~v2 each. Note also that we cannot do better than deter-
mining the ~ai and ~vi up to sign, since the Qij are homogeneous functions of
second degree in these variables.
6
9. Once the 2n vectors ~ai and ~vi are obtained, so is clearly the inertial system
(up to orientation) and the inertial timescale. This is as far as Tait’s solution
to Thomson’s problem goes.
One remarkable thing about Tait’s solution is that the spatial inertial system
and the inertial timescale are determined together. However, this is really not sur-
prising: The mathematical problem of calculating the k labels ta representing “in-
stants” cannot be separated from the characterisation of the instants themselves. In
this sense it might be said – following Julian Barbour [2] – that instants are not to
be located in time, but that time is rather to be found in instants. Thus it seems
that the philosophical discussion concerning the reality of time (see e.g. [11] for
an up-to-date account) is then really a discussion concerning the reality of instants.
But in point mechanics instants are relational configurations the reality of which
cannot be doubted without mocking the theory.
Mechanics without parameter-time
If time can be read off instances, as claimed above, we should, at least in principle,
be able to altogether eliminate the parameter t from the laws. How does the t-less
version of Newtonian mechanics look like? One answer has been well known for
a long time, albeit in a somewhat hybrid form in which the absolute positions in
space still feature. It goes under the name of Jacobi’s principle, after Carl Gus-
tav Jacobi (1804-1851). It takes the form of a geodesic principle in configuration
space. That means, it determines the physically realised paths in configuration
space between any pair (qi,qf ) of given points to be that of shortest length. Here
“length” is measured in some appropriate metric that encodes the essential dynam-
ical information.
Note that the parameter t plays no roˆle: its value at the initial and final point
need not be specified. Rather, the measure of inertial time elapsed between the
initial and final configuration can be calculated after the dynamical trajectory has
been determined through the geodesic principle. Let there be n mass points whose
positions are (~q1, · · · , ~qn) =: q, moving under the influence of a potential V (q).
The configuration space is R3n and its Riemannian metric, with respect to which
the physically realised trajectories of constant Energy E are geodesics, is given by
g = (E − V )T , where T in the positive-definite bi-linear form that appears in the
expression for the kinetic energy (“kinetic-energy metric”). The inertial time that
has elapsed along the length-minimising trajectory between qi and qf is then given
by
∆t(qi,qf ) =
∫ qf
qi
√
T
(
dq/dλ, dq/dλ
)
E − V (q) dλ . (8)
This may be understood as saying that time has to be chosen in such a fashion so
as to lead to the standard form of energy conservation. Indeed, from (8) we get
E = T
(
dq/dt , dq/dt
)
+ V (q) . (9)
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Note that (8) only depends on the pair (qi,qf ) and not on the way we parametrise
the path. Hence the choice of the parameter λ is arbitrary. Therefore we have a
well defined map
∆t : R3n × R3n → R+ (10)
which, for given energy E, assigns to each pair of points in the configuration space
the inertial-time duration of the physical journey connecting them. As we will dis-
cuss next, there is a certain analog to Jacobi’s Principle in General Relativity, with
some additional issues arising due to the fact that the fundamental mathematical
entities being fields rather than point-particles. Finally we point out that there is
a generalisation to Jacobi’s principle in models of point mechanics without abso-
lute space. In these models only the instantaneous relative distances enter the laws
and the time lapse can again be calculated from the dynamical trajectories. First
attempts were Reissner’s (1874-1967) [17] and Schro¨dinger’s [18], with the full
“relativisation” of time being achieved only much later in [3]. See also [4] for more
on the modern context and translations of the papers by Reissner, Schro¨dinger etc.
3 General Relativity
Einstein’s equations are equations for entire spacetimes, that is, pairs (M, g) where
M is a four-dimensional differentiable manifold endowed with a certain geomet-
ric structure called Lorentzian metric, which is here represented by g. Given such
a pair (M, g) and a specification of certain aspects of physical matter, it makes
unambiguous sense to say that (M, g) does, or does not, satisfy Einstein’s equa-
tions. No external notion of time enters the picture at this stage. This, clearly, is
for good reasons: Spacetimes do not evolve (in “time” external to them); they sim-
ply are! In addition, no conditions concerning structures internal to (M, g) need
to be imposed, such as sequential ordering of substructures (to be interpreted as
“instants”), absence of closed timelike curves (i.e. journeys into ones own past),
or causal evolution of geometry. On the other hand, Einstein’s equations are com-
patible with the additional imposition of such structures. It required the hard work
of mathematicians of many years to show that a reasonable set of such additional
conditions exist which ensure that Einstein’s equations allow for well posed initial
value problems in the sense explained above.
In particular, these conditions ensure that the spacetime can be thought of as
the history of space. In a loose mathematical sense this means that spacetime
is a staking of spaces, each one being an instant. More precisely, spacetime is
foliated by a one-parameter family of embeddings of space into spacetime. This
is schematically represented in Figure 1. For that to make mathematical sense we
must be sure that a single space, Σ, suffices to foliate spacetime. Its geometry may
change from leaf to leaf, but not its essential properties as differentiable manifold,
for otherwise we could not speak of its evolution. In particular this means that its
topological properties are preserved during evolution, like its connectedness and
its higher topological invariants; see Figure 2.
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Σ Et
Et′
Et′′
Σt
Σt′
Σt′′M
Figure 1: Spacetime, M , is foliated by a one-parameter family of embeddings Et of the
3-manifold Σ into M . Here t is a formal label without direct physical significance. Σt is
the image in M of Σ under Et. Each such Σt is an instant.
One of the fundamental difficulties with the notion of spacetime as history of
space is its inherent redundancy: There are many ways to describe one and the
same spacetime as the evolution of space. This is explained in Figure 3. This
means that if we cast Einstein’s equations into the form of evolution equations for
“space”, we cannot expect unique solutions, contrary to what is usually required for
well posed initial-value problems. The point here is that the non-uniqueness is not
arbitrary. It is precisely of the amount that accounts for the different ways to move
space through a fixed spacetime, no more and no less. This is closely related to the
infamous “Hole Argument” [15]. That relaxation of the uniqueness requirement
is familiar from so-called “gauge-theories” and does not imply any renunciation
from determinism of fundamental laws, at least as long as the degree of arbitrari-
ness in the analytical expression of the evolution is under complete mathematical
control. Physical configurations are then taken to be the equivalence classes under
the relation that identifies any two apparently different evolutions that give rise to
the same spacetimes (more precisely: diffeomorphism-class of spacetimes).
The Chronos principle
Modulo the difficulties just mentioned, we may ask whether we can extract a no-
tion of time merely from the information of instants. An instant here is a spatial
configuration, that is a pair (Σ, h), where Σ is a 3-dimensional manifold and h
is a Riemannian (i.e. positive definite) metric. One obvious question concerning
Einstein’s equations is this: given two instants (Σ1, h1) and (Σ2, h2), can we asso-
ciate a measure of time by which they are apart if we assume that both 3-geometries
occur in a spacetime that satisfies Einstein’s equations. This is known as the “sand-
wich conjecture” in General Relativity and known to fail in many known examples
which are, however, of special symmetry that renders the problem singular. For ex-
ample, it is obvious that specifying any two flat 3-slices in Minkowski space does
not give us any information on their separation. Similarly, it has been shown that
in the spherically symmetric case a similar underdetermination prevails [16]. On
the other hand, it has been an old hope that a suitable analog of Jacobi’s principle,
and in particular formula (8), is also valid in General relativity. This has been first
9
initial space
final space
spacetime
initial space
two final
components
of space
Figure 2: Schematic rendering of spacetimes. The one on the left may be viewed as time
evolution of space. Time runs upwards and space corresponds to the horizontal sections,
here depicted by a 3-holed surface. In the spacetime on the right an initial connected space
at the bottom, represented by a single 6-holed surface, evolves into two 3-holed pieces.
This spacetime cannot be viewed as time evolution of a single space and shall be excluded
from the discussion.
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Σt
Σt+dt
p
p′
β
αn
∂
∂t
Figure 3: There is a large ambiguity in moving from an initial space-slice Σt “forward
in time”. For q ∈ Σ the image points p = Et(q) and p′ = Et+dt(q) are connected by the
vector ∂/∂t|p whose components tangential and normal to Σt are β (three functions) and
αn (one function) respectively. Hence there is a four-function worth of ambiguity to move
Σt in a given ambient spacetime.
proposed in the classic and well known paper [1] of 1962. An apparently less well
known contribution appeared 12 years later, in which the following “Chronos Prin-
ciple” in General Relativity was proposed, according to which time is a measure
for the distance of instantaneous configurations (instants) [6]. Moreover, it was
asked in [6] whether such measures existed such that one would not have to know
the entire spatial configuration in order to determine the time span.
“This postulate contains the statement that it is not necessary to look
at the change in configuration of the entire universe to measure time.
It is sufficient to measure the change in configuration of only a local-
ized region of the universe, and one is assured that the local time thus
obtained will be equal to that of any other region, and indeed equal to
the global time.” ([6], p. 76)
It is this localisation property that renders this reading of time from instants physi-
cally viable. Let us therefore see how it can be satisfied. The answer, quite surpris-
ingly, leads more or less directly to General Relativity. We shall give the argument
in a slightly simplified form.
As already stated, Einstein’s equations can be cast into evolutionary form. In
that form one may identify a kinetic-energy metric, just like in point mechanics. It
reads:
ds2 =
∫
Σ
d3x Gab nm[h(x)]dhab(x)dhnm(x) (11)
where Gab nm[h(x)] is a certain expression that depends on the metric tensor h of
space but not on its derivatives (ultralocal dependence). It is sometimes called the
Wheeler-DeWitt metric. The measure of time will be obtained by a rescaling of
the kinetic-energy metric, just like in (8). Hence one writes
dτ2 =
ds2∫
Σ d
3x R(x)
. (12)
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HereRmust be a scalar function of the spatial metric h. The simplest non-constant
such function is the scalar curvature, which depends on h and its derivatives up to
order 2. The condition that the measure of time be compatible with arbitrarily
fine localisation Σ → U ⊂ Σ leads requires the integrands in the numerator and
denominator of (12) to be proportional. Without loss of generality we can take this
constant of proportionality (which cannot be zero) to be 1 (this just fixes the overall
scale of physical time) and obtain
Gab nm[h(x)]
dhab(x)
dτ
dhnm(x)
dτ
−R[h](x) = 0 . (13)
This is a well known formula (the so-called Hamiltonian constraint) in General
Relativity. Hence Relativity just satisfies the localisation property with the simplest
conceivable local rescaling functionR. Finally, physical time is now given in terms
of 3-dimensional geometric quantities by a Jacobi-like formula, which is just the
analog of (8) in the case E = 0:
∆τ(gi,gf ) =
∫ gf
gi
√
G
(
dg/dλ, dg/dλ
)
−R[g(λ)] dλ (14)
4 Conclusions and open issues
Following [2] we tried to argue that the notion of “time from instances” in inherent
in classical point mechanics as well as General Relativity. We also saw that in
General Relativity that notion of time is not as hopelessly global as one might have
feared. In fact, one can argue that General Relativity just realises the simplest
localisable notion of that sort of time.
But there are also points that remain open (to me):
1. Solutions to dynamical equations of motion in the form of (generalised)
geodesic principles are subsets of (dynamically realised) configurations in
the space of (kinematically possible) ones. These subsets are delivered to us
in the form of unparametrised curves. So, even though the parameter does
not matter, the structure of a one-dimensional sub-continuum remains. In
particular one (or two) preferred orderings are selected. What is the sig-
nificance of that? What makes us experience this solution configurations
according to this order?
2. Can we, on the space of 3-geometries, characterise a function that structures
it according to some definition of geometric entropy? How would its gradient
flow be related to the dynamics of General Relativity?
3. Suppose the spacetime we live in did not allow for any symmetries and were
sufficiently generic, so as to not allow for two different isometric embed-
dings of any of its possible 3-geometries. (Such spacetimes exist and are,
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intuitively speaking, the generic case, though their degree of generality or
naturalness is not easy to characterise mathematically.) This means that
each instant would have its unique place in spacetime. Would this count
as a perfect representation of the “Now” in a physical theory (here General
Relativity), or could/should we ask for more?
Finally I wish to comment on the transition of point mechanics to field theory.
In point mechanics, the requirement to only employ purely relational quantities
is met by eliminating all explicit reference to absolute space and time. This has
been gradually achieved in the papers of Reissner, Schro¨dinger, and Barbour &
Bertotti. But what is the precise analog of that requirement in field theory? A
standard answer to this is that the theory should be background independent. The
intended meaning of that phrase is that the theory should not employ structures
which are not dynamically active. Closer inspection shows that it is quite hard to
translate this intended meaning into a clear mathematical condition [9]. The prob-
lem is that whatever the mathematical formulation is, it seems quite easy to turn
it into an equivalent one by some formal rewriting that renders it (formally) back-
ground independent. It is often taken for granted that the requirement of diffeomor-
phism invariance (also known as “general covariance”) is sufficient, because that
would deprive spacetime points of their independent individuality. This is true to
some extend, but it seems not to go as far as one might have hoped for. Modern
(quantum-)field theory does not get rid of space and time.
Markus Fierz was deeply concerned about the problematic relation between
spacetime and fields. In a remarkable letter of October 9-10th 1951 to Wolfgang
Pauli1 he wrote ([12], Vol. IV, Part I, Doc. 1287, p. 379)
“There exist [in classical physics–DG] solutions [to field equations–
DG] with empty domains, that is, emptied from all fields. Hence one
needs a theory of space which is independent of what fills space. There
is the geometry of space and the laws of things in space. [...]
Space is still absolute in Relativity Theory insofar as one may char-
acterise it without referring to its ‘content’, and because it may even
exist without any content. [...]
In a [hypothetical–DG] full Theory of Quantum Fields, in which the
act of observation and the possibility to localise are described cor-
rectly, it should not be necessary to introduce space separately. Oppo-
site to what Einstein hoped, the laws of space should follow from the
laws of Nature (not the laws of Nature from geometry). But this can
only be hoped for if there is no such thing as empty space, that is, if
you cannot clear [ausra¨umen] space. Fields are not in space, they span
space. Space is not a geometric idea [Gedankending], it is a certain
aspect of the world.”
1 There exist two versions of this letter, one from October 9th and one from October 10th. Here we
quote from the fist only.
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In this sense, space in Relativity Theory is absolute and this is why
Einstein suggested to call it aether. In a proper field theory the theory
of localisation should deliver a theory of space. Space should some-
how be ‘created’ by test bodies and hence be a function of the observer
in a much deeper sense than in Relativity Theory.”
Pauli replied on October 13 in a way that would also be typical for many modern
relativists ([12], Vol. IV, Part I, Doc. 1289, pp. 385-386):
“Your wording does not do justice to Relativity Theory, which is just
an attempt to connect geometry and laws of nature concerning things
[Dinge] in the spacetime world. [...] All people happily proclaim just
the opposite to what you said in your letter: namely from now on only
the connection of spacetime and things is absolute. [...]
I am quite indignant about this part of your letter, since it shows to
me that the, compared to me, slightly younger generation of physicists
(not to speak of the still younger ones!) have completely repressed
[verdra¨ngen] General Relativity - and because I know how important
Einstein considered this point to be. [...]
After this urgent correction (diagnosis: ‘repression’ [Verdra¨ngung]!)
one can ask whether the dependence of space (i.e. spacetime) from the
things [Dingen] according to General Relativity is sufficient. To pose
the question already means to negate it. [...]
I agree that the impossibility to accommodate Einstein’s postulate (i.e.
Mach’s original point of view) within General Relativity is a deep and
significant sign for the inadequacy of classical field physics.”
So we see that after his usual grumble Pauli finally agrees at least on the existence
of a fundamental difficulty, which was, after all, well addressed by Fierz’ original
complaint. Even today all candidate theories of quantum gravity make use of non-
dynamical structures that represent some sort of space or spacetime (of various
dimensions). Hence I believe Fierz’ complaint is as as relevant today as it was 60
years ago.
Everyone knows the opening words of Hermann Minkowski’s (1864-1909) fa-
mous address “Raum und Zeit”, delivered in Cologne on September 21st 1908 [13]:
“Gentlemen! The views of space and time which I wish to lay before
you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics. Therein lies
their strength. They are radical. Henceforth space by itself, and time
by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind
of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.”
But it seems not to be so well known that Minkowski felt the enormous abstraction
and possible physical over-idealisation of the concept of spacetime as such, as he
clearly indicated in his introduction, before going into the description of what we
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now call “Minkowski space” (space meaning spacetime). He wanted his readers to
understand the points of spacetime as individuated entities:
“In order to not leave a yawning void [ga¨hnende Leere], we wish to
imagine that at every place and at every time something perceivable
exists. In order to avoid saying ‘matter’ or ‘electricity’ for that some-
thing, I will use the word ‘substance’ for it. We focus attention on the
substantive [substantiellen] world point at x, y, z, t and imagine to be
capable to recognise this substantive point at any other time”.
That substantivalist’s view of Minkowski spacetime is still inherent in its mathe-
matical representation in modern field theory. One sign of this is the interpretation
of its automorphism group (the Poincare´ group) as proper physical symmetries
rather than gauge transformations. Recall that a proper physical symmetry trans-
forms solutions to dynamical equations into solutions, but the transformed solu-
tion is considered physically different (distinguishable) from the original one. In
contrast, gauge transformations just connect redundant descriptions of the same
physical situation.
Individuating spacetime points is natural if we think of spacetime to be a ge-
ometrically structured set. A set, by Cantor’s definition, consists first of all of a
set which may then carry certain geometric structures of various complexities. But
recall what according to Cantor’s definition it already takes to be a set [5]:
“By a set we understand any gathering togetherM of determined well-
distinguished objects m of our intuition or of our thinking (which are
called elements of M ) into a whole.”
Minkowski’s “substance” may serve to distinguish events. But is that substance
not eventually just another physical system obeying its own dynamical laws? If so,
what kind of “dynamical law” can that be if there is no non-dynamical substance
left with respect to which we can define change. Surprisingly – or perhaps not –
this is just the same difficulty that stood at the very beginning of modern theories
of dynamics. In “de gravitatione”, written well before the Principia, presumably
between 1664 and 1673 (the dating is still controversial), Newton said [14]:
“It is accordingly necessary that the determination of places and thus
of local motions is represented in some unmoved being of which sort
space or extension alone is that which is seen as distinct from bodies.
[...]
About extension, then, it is probably expected that it is being defined
either as substance or accidents or nothing at all. But by no means
nothing, surely, therefore it has some mode of existence proper to it-
self, by of which it fits neither to substance nor to accident.”
15
“Das noch A¨ltere ist immer das Neue”
Wolfgang Pauli
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